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In contrast to the disappearing dividends view prevalent in the literature, we document extensive 
dividend payments by firms and significant variability within firms and across 16 countries during 
2000–2013. We predict that within-firm variability in dividends increases investor demand for 
forward-looking dividend information, and analysts respond by producing informative dividend 
forecasts. We find that analyst dividend forecasts are available for most dividend-paying firms and 
are more prevalent for firms with higher variability of dividends. Analyst dividend forecasts are more 
accurate than alternative proxies based on extrapolations of past dividends. Finally, dividend forecasts 
(i) are incrementally useful to investors beyond information in other fundamentals such as earnings 
and cash flow forecasts, (ii) help investors interpret earnings quality, and (iii) are associated with 
investors’ portfolio allocation decisions.  
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Over the past decade, the academic thinking on dividends has been framed by two 
perspectives. On one hand, research suggests that dividends are ‘sticky’ in the sense that companies 
are believed to be reluctant to alter them (Lintner 1956; Aharony and Swary 1980; Cyert, Kang and 
Kumar 1996; Fama and French 2001; Brav et al. 2005). On the other hand, more recent research 
argues that dividends are declining in importance, being displaced by stock repurchase programs 
(Denis and Osobov 2008; Hoberg and Prabhala 2009; Baker Chang, Dutta and Saadi 2012). Neither 
perspective implies a need for analyst dividend forecasts. However, motivated by recent studies on 
rising dividend payouts that we discuss below, our study examines factors associated with analysts 
providing explicit dividend forecasts and their usefulness to investors. 
Our premise is that an increasing importance of dividends to investor portfolio returns, 
driven by increasing dividend payouts and dividend variability, increases investor demand for 
explicit dividend forecasts. Recent evidence suggests the frequency and magnitudes of dividends are 
increasing, especially among U.S. firms. For example, Floyd, Li and Skinner (2015) report that the 
proportion of U.S. industrial payers doubles between 2001 and 2012, and 58.8% of U.S. dividend 
payers increased their annual dividend over the period 2001–2012, which doubled aggregate 
dividends.1 Kahle and Stulz (2021) and Michaely and Moin (2021) document these trends continue 
through 2019. Similar trends are present globally, as Vieira (2011) reports that during 1994–2004, 
an average of 66% of French firms and 81% of UK firms increased dividends. As dividend 
frequency and magnitudes increase, so should investor demand for dividend forecasts as dividends 
become a more significant component of returns. Indeed, Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2008) 
report that the dividend yield accounted for 90% of the real return from global equities over the 
 
1 In the U.S., the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 reduced the tax rate on dividends to 15%, 
increasing the advantage of dividends over share repurchases as a way of distributing excess cash to shareholders 
(Chetty and Saez 2005; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner 2007). 
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period 1900–2005. Further, conditional on investor demand incentivizing analysts to provide 
dividend forecasts, we investigate the usefulness of dividend expectations to assessments of 
earnings quality. Positive earnings surprises accompanied by positive dividend surprises indicate 
more sustainable earnings given reinforcing dividend news (Bhattacharya 1979; Kane, Lee and 
Marcus 1984; John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock 1985; Ofer and Thakor 1987; Skinner and 
Soltes 2011).  
It is not obvious analysts would release dividend forecasts for at least two reasons. First, the 
cost of producing dividend forecasts may outweigh their usefulness to investors. For example, 
dividend forecasts could be redundant with other estimates present, such as cash flow forecasts or 
extrapolative dividend forecasts. Second, forecasts of dividends require complementary forecasts of 
other fundamentals, like long-term cash flows and earnings, both of which exhibit significant 
forecast errors (Givoly, Hayn and Lehavy 2009; Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok 2003; Call, Chen 
and Tong 2013). Consequently, analysts may be reluctant to formally release dividend forecasts if 
they are subject to large errors with potential negative reputation effects (Ertimur, Mayew and 
Stubben 2011).  
The first part of the study examines whether analysts respond to demand for dividend 
forecasts and how accurate these forecasts are. Specifically, to understand the demand for analysts 
to provide dividend forecasts and whether they are useful, our first set of tests investigate several 
features of dividend forecasts, including (i) the frequency with which analysts forecast dividends for 
firms from multiple countries, (ii) whether increased variability in firm-level dividend policies is 
associated with a higher propensity to release dividend forecasts, (iii) the relative accuracy of 
dividend forecasts compared to extrapolative dividend estimates, and (iv) the incremental 
informativeness of such forecasts beyond other analyst estimates.  
The second part of the study extends the analysis of the usefulness of dividend forecasts to 
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investors by examining two possible uses of analyst dividend forecasts. First, we build on dividend 
signaling models and examine whether investors respond to analyst forecast-based dividend 
surprises consistent with them providing information about the persistence of earnings news and 
earnings growth. Second, we test whether dividend forecasts are associated with portfolio allocation 
decisions, particularly among investors who benefit from tax-advantaged dividend treatment. 
Our tests use all I/B/E/S annual dividend forecasts spanning 2000–2013 for the U.S., twelve 
European countries, Australia, and two Asian countries. Our sample deliberately captures 
heterogeneous settings — markets where dividends are both ubiquitous and less frequent (non-U.S. 
vs. U.S. samples) and where dividend guidance is either routine or rare (Japan vs. other countries),2 
which creates variation in investor demand for dividend information and in the possible usefulness 
of dividend forecasts. We find that analysts provide dividend forecasts for 87.9% of all dividend-
paying firms, with an average of 14 dividend forecasts per firm-year. In the U.S., the proportion of 
dividend payers with at least one dividend forecast available from I/B/E/S increases from 3% in 
2001 to 96% in 2013; the proportion of dividend forecasts available for European dividend payers 
increases from 78% to 90%, and for dividend payers in Australia, Japan, the U.K. and Hong Kong 
from 52% to 84%.  
To understand why investors would demand dividend forecasts, we examine the association 
between variability in firm-level dividend policies and analysts’ propensity to forecast dividends for 
that firm.3 On average, 54% (21%) [25%] of dividend payers increase (decrease) [maintain] the 
annual dividend compared to the previous year. As predicted, logistic regressions confirm a strong 
 
2 The Japanese market is unique, because managers must simultaneously announce the current year's dividends and 
earnings as well as forecasts of next year's dividends and earnings (Conroy, Eades and Harris 2000).  
3 By correlating variability in dividend payments to analysts’ supply of dividend forecasts, we can infer how dividend 
uncertainty is associated with investor demand for dividend information. See DeFond and Hung (2003), Givoly et al. 




association between variability of dividend payments and analysts’ propensity to report dividend 
forecasts — a one standard deviation increase in dividend volatility increases the likelihood of 
analysts reporting dividend forecasts by 21%. This result is noteworthy given a well-documented 
analyst preference to follow firms with less volatile fundamentals (Lang and Lundholm 1996). We 
also find that dividend forecasts are more likely to be available for firms with high institutional 
ownership, especially those with high concentrations of pension funds and endowments that are 
either fully or largely exempt from dividend income taxes (Allen, Bernardo and Welch 2000; Del 
Guercio 1996; Gompers and Metrick 2001). Analysts should be particularly influenced by 
institutional demand for dividend forecasts because those investors affect their compensation and 
career outcomes (Jackson 2005; Beyer and Guttman 2011; Maber, Groysberg and Healy 2014).  
Next, to provide supporting evidence on the link between dividend variability and investor 
demand for analyst dividend forecasts, we confirm that analysts’ dividend forecasts are more 
accurate than various time-series dividend forecasts that investors could readily implement. 
Consistent with the documented variability of dividends, which would result in poor time-series 
extrapolations, analyst dividend forecasts are on average 45.9% more accurate than random walk 
dividend estimates — the most commonly used time-series dividend forecast (Benartzi, Michaely 
and Thaler 1997; Yoon and Starks 1995; Hail, Tahun and Wang 2014). Further, initiations and 
omissions of dividends are especially important events for investors (Asquith and Mullins 1983; 
Michaely, Thaler and Womack 1995). We find that analysts exhibit some ability to predict dividend 
initiations and omissions, a feat not possible with time-series models. For example, analysts do not 
release dividend forecasts in the year of omission for 45% of firms that end up dropping a dividend, 
and explicitly forecast a zero dividend for 24.3% of such firms; for initiations, analysts provide 
dividend forecasts for 42% of firms prior to the announcement of dividend initiation.  
We then examine the more important question of whether dividend forecasts convey new 
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information, as demand for such forecasts is only sustainable if they are informative. Dividend 
forecast revisions are associated with significant price reactions, even after controlling for 
contemporaneous earnings and cash flow forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices. A one 
standard deviation increase in a dividend forecast revision is associated with a 5.2% higher price 
response. For comparison, similar revisions in earnings (cash flow) forecasts are associated with an 
8.1% (2.7%) incremental price response. Focusing on concurrent dividend and earnings 
announcements also reveals that investors react positively to firms that beat analyst dividend 
expectations; a one standard deviation increase in a dividend (earnings) [cash flow] surprise is 
associated with a 7.3% (6.1%) [3.2%] incremental price response, consistent with strong 
information content of dividends relative to other fundamentals. 
In the second part of our analysis, we highlight two possible uses of analyst dividend 
forecasts. A compelling argument for the importance of dividends is their signaling value for future 
earnings (Miller and Rock 1985). Dividend signaling models suggest managers increase dividends 
when they expect higher future earnings. Thus, positive earnings surprises accompanied by positive 
dividend surprises should indicate more sustainable earnings than positive earnings without 
reinforcing dividend news. Indeed, we find that investors react more positively when the sign of 
dividend news is consistent with the sign of earnings news. We also demonstrate that, conditional on 
the sign of earnings news, firms that beat dividend expectations in the current period are 
incrementally more likely to report subsequent earnings growth. Importantly, we link to prior 
literature by showing that time-series dividend forecasts lend no support to the dividend signaling 
hypothesis, consistent with evidence in Lang and Litzenberger (1989), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1996) and Benartzi et al. (1997). Allen and Michaely (2003, p. 73) review the dividend 
signaling literature and conclude, “[T]he overall accumulated evidence does not support the 
assertion that dividend changes convey information about future earnings.” In contrast, we show 
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that analysts’ dividend forecasts, not dividend changes, are associated with future earnings.    
Our final test documents that changes in institutional investor holdings are associated with 
analyst dividend forecast revisions, and the association is particularly strong for (low dividend tax) 
pension funds and endowments. A one standard deviation increase in a dividend (earnings) forecasts 
is associated with a 2.3% (2.1%) increase in institutional holdings, consistent with numerous studies 
highlighting the importance of dividends to these investors.4  
Our study joins recent research challenging the common perception in the accounting and 
finance literatures that dividends are sticky and declining in importance, which would suggest little 
demand for dividend forecasts. The trends of increased dividend initiations in the U.S., significant 
increases in global dividend payouts, and overall variability of dividend payments support investor 
demand for analyst dividend forecasts. The study also fills an important gap in the literature on the 
signaling value of analyst dividend forecasts and their usefulness in assessing earnings persistence. 
The latter result offers useful insight into the ‘dividend puzzle’ regarding higher valuations of 
dividend-paying firms (Baker, Powell and Veit 2002), as well as to the mixed evidence on the 
association between dividend changes and dividend announcement returns, and between dividend 
changes and future earnings (Lang and Litzenberger 1989; DeAngelo et al. 1996; Benartzi et al. 
1997). By specifically using analysts’ dividend forecasts as proxy for investor expectations, our 
results confirm the intuition that investors view dividends as barometers of the persistence of future 
earnings.  
II. DATA 
We collect individual analysts’ annual dividend forecasts for fiscal years 2000–2013, together 
 
4 Del Guercio (1996) and Schanzenbach and Sitkoff (2007) report that bank trust departments avoid non-dividend-
paying firms, and Gompers and Metrick (2001), Bennett, Sias and Starks (2003) and Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
document that institutional investors avoid investing in firms that do not pay dividends. Harris, Hartzmark and Solomon 
(2015) highlight that some mutual funds pay a premium to purchase stocks before dividend payments to artificially 
increase reported dividend income, and investors reward these funds with higher net inflows.  
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with actual values from I/B/E/S.5 If actual dividends are missing, we use information from Compustat 
for U.S. firms and Compustat Global for non-U.S. firms. We start in 2000 because, as we show next, 
dividend forecasts for U.S. firms are not available before that date. We collect share price information 
from CRSP and the Compustat Global Security Daily files. We exclude firms where the default 
reporting currency is different from the currency in which the stock trades. The final sample includes 
651,759 dividend forecasts for 12,137 firms issued by 19,427 analysts employed by 890 brokers. 
Table 1 reports the annual proportion of firms paying dividends for firms with any analyst 
coverage on I/B/E/S. The proportion of U.S. dividend payers with analyst coverage is 21.5% in 
2000 and increases to 57.6% in 2013. The relatively small proportion of dividend payers in the U.S. 
in early 2000s is consistent with Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 
(2004), and the increase in the proportion of dividend payers after 2001 is consistent with Julio and 
Ikenberry (2004), Floyd et al. (2015), Kahle and Stulz (2021), Michaely and Moin (2021) and 
Factset Dividend Quarterly (2013). The proportion of non-U.S. payers is comparatively stable over 
the sample period averaging 73.5% in 2000 and 75.0% in 2013.6 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Figure 1a plots time trends in the availability of dividend forecasts across firms broadly 
grouped as (i) the U.S., (ii) Australia, Japan, the U.K. and Hong Kong (aggregated based on common 
legal backgrounds), and (iii) Europe. There are no dividend forecasts reported on I/B/E/S for U.S. 
dividend-paying firms before 2001, but the proportion of U.S. firms with dividend forecasts increases 
from 3% in 2001 to over 96% in 2013. These results are consistent with Table 1 evidence showing an 
 
5 We use annual dividend forecasts because (i) in most countries outside the U.S., firms pay annual dividends, (ii) the 
majority of previous studies examine annual dividend announcements (Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair 1996; 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1990; DeAngelo et al. 2004) and (iii) DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) highlight that dividend 
policy is most often determined once per year at fiscal year-end.  
6 The decline in the proportion of dividend payers in the U.K. is consistent with Kilincarslan and Ozdemir (2018) and 
Driver, Grosman and Scaramozzino (2020) who document significant delistings from the London Stock Exchange that 
are almost offset by new listings. Although new listing firms are less likely to be dividend payers, Driver et al. (2020) 
also note that total dividends almost double during the same period.   
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increasing frequency of dividend payments in the U.S., which presumably motivates analysts to 
forecast dividends.7 The proportion of dividend payers with dividend forecasts in Australia, Japan, 
the U.K. and Hong Kong increases from 52% in fiscal year 2000 to 84% in 2013, consistent with 
trends in prior studies (e.g., Coulton and Ruddock 2011; Henry 2011; Bergmann 2016). The 
proportion of dividend payers with dividend forecasts in Europe increases from 78% in 2000 to 90% 
in 2013.   
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Figure 1b reports time-trends in the availability of dividend forecasts for individual analysts 
following dividend-paying firms, and trends mirror those from Figure 1a. The proportion of analysts 
reporting dividend forecasts for U.S. dividend payers increases from 0% in 2000 to 46% in 2013. 
The comparable increases for dividend payers in Australia, Japan, the U.K. and Hong Kong 
(Europe) are from 28% (46%) in 2000 to 70% (77%) in 2013. We note that once analysts have 
provided dividend forecasts for a firm, there is at least one dividend forecast for each firm-year over 
the remaining sample period (or until the firm stops paying dividends) for 91.8% of cases 
(untabulated).8 
Table 2 presents distributional data on dividend forecasts for firms with analyst coverage. 
The overall average annual proportion of dividend payers is 75.5%. The U.S. exhibits the lowest 
percentage of dividend payers (42.7%), and Japan has the highest (91.6%), in line with earlier 
evidence (Hail et al. 2014; Goldstein et al. 2015; Trabelsi, Aziz and Lilti 2019). On average, 
 
7 Unavailability of analyst dividend forecasts in the U.S. before 2001 can explain why these forecasts are absent in prior 
research and possibly why they are viewed as relatively unimportant. For example, Liu, Nissim and Thomas (2002, p. 
147) note that “analyst forecasts of future dividends are not available on I/B/E/S.” The spike in the availability of 
dividend forecasts in (i) the U.S. and (ii) Australia, Japan, Hong Kong and the U.K. in the first two sample years reflects 
a combination of increased analyst dividend forecasting and increased I/B/E/S reporting efforts. Whether driven by 
dividend forecast expansion or I/B/E/S collection efforts, both are consistent with an increased demand for dividend 
forecasts.  
8 In untabulated results, we find (i) no evidence that dividend forecasts cluster in any fiscal quarter and (ii) the average 
duration between the dividend forecast release and the actual dividend announcement is 230 days. 
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dividend forecasts are available for 87.9% of all dividend payers. Although dividends are 
conceptually paid out of earnings, cash flow forecasts can help investors assess a firm’s ability to 
pay dividends. The proportion of dividend payers with both dividend and cash flow forecasts is 
63.7%.9 The per year average number of dividend forecasts is 14.4, approximately half the average 
number of earnings forecasts (34.3 per year). The number of dividend forecasts is also less than the 
average number of revenue forecasts (20.4 per year), but comparable to the average number of cash 
flow forecasts (12.6 per year).  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Overall, Figures 1 and Tables 1–2 reveal a significant and increasing trend in the proportion 
of U.S. firms paying dividends, and widespread availability of dividend forecasts for dividend 
payers globally. The increased availability of analyst dividend forecasts is consistent with investor 
demand for these estimates.  
III. INVESTOR DEMAND FOR ANALYST DIVIDEND FORECASTS 
In this section, we revisit the common assumption in the accounting and finance literature 
that dividends are sticky, which implies low demand for analyst dividend forecasts as investors can 
easily extrapolate recent dividends. We first provide evidence on annual changes in dividend-per-
share and payout ratios. Then, we examine our prediction that higher variability in dividend 
payments, combined with the increasing trend in the frequency of dividend payments, increases 
investor demand for dividend forecasts. Further, if analyst dividend forecasts are more accurate than 
alternative estimates, this will also support demand for these forecasts. Thus, we also benchmark the 
 
9 The seemingly high proportion of dividend and cash flow forecasts for dividend-paying firms can be explained by two 
factors. First, dividend-paying firms tend to be the largest firms in any market we examine and often form part of the 
main local market index. To illustrate, 425 constituent firms of the S&P500 index paid out dividends in 2015. Dividend 
payers tend to have broad analyst coverage and likely include a disproportionally high number of cash flow forecasts. 
Second, Call et al. (2013) report that the proportion of firms with EPS and cash flow forecasts increases from 26.2% in 
2000 to 56.4% in 2008.  
10 
 
accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts against that of dividend estimates from common 
extrapolative approaches.  
Figure 2a reports the average proportion of firms increasing or reducing dividends-per-share 
versus maintaining the same dividend. Across sample countries, an average of 54% of firms 
increase dividends, 21% reduce dividends, while only 25% maintain dividends across fiscal years.10 
In the U.S., 62% of firms increase dividends compared to the prior year, and 11% of firms reduce 
dividends. Figure 2b reports changes in annual dividend payout ratios, and the trends are similar to 
those in Figure 2a.  
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
Next, we relate variability in dividend payments to analysts’ propensity to provide dividend 
forecasts. The dependent variable in a logistic regression (Div forecast) equals 1 if a firm has 
available at least one dividend forecast in the next fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise. The main 
explanatory variable is dividend variability (Dividend STD) — the standard deviation of asset-scaled 
dividends measured over the previous five years. The logistic model is:  
𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖𝑣 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡+1)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽5% 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6 ln 𝑀𝑉𝑡(𝑈𝑆𝐷) + 𝛽7 ln
𝐵
𝑀⁄ 𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛽11𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
+ 𝛽14𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜂𝑡+1. 
(1) 
The set of controls includes firm characteristics likely associated with dividend uncertainty and, 
 
10 Figure 2a uses I/B/E/S dividend-per-share actuals that are adjusted for changes in share numbers (e.g., due to stock 
splits or repurchases), so the results are not due to a denominator effect. If an I/B/E/S dividend actual is missing, we use 
Compustat and Compustat Global dividend data scaled by the number of shares outstanding from I/B/E/S summary 
pricing files. The trend in Figure 2a is virtually the same when we use changes in the Compustat item DVC (i.e., total 
dividends other than stock dividends). Also, we observe similar frequencies in dividend increases before and after the 
financial crisis, but the number of dividend reductions is markedly higher during the financial crisis. Finally, to assess 
the effect of delistings, we calculate changes in dividend-per-share for a constant sample of dividend payers that survive 
our sample period. The untabulated results for this sample are similar to the main sample: 57% of firms increase, 20% 
reduce and 24% maintain a constant dividend. For the U.S., the comparable fractions are 62%, 18%, 20%, respectively. 
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thus, investor demand for analyst dividend forecasts (see definitions in the Appendix). They include 
earnings and cash flow volatility measured over the previous five years (Earnings STD and Cash 
Flow STD), a loss in the prior year (Loss), profitability (ROA), market capitalization (MV (USD)), 
and growth opportunities (B/M). We also separately control for institutional holdings (IO) and the 
proportion of institutional holdings held by pension funds and endowments (% pension funds).  
To capture cross-country variation in demand for dividend information, we include 
Importance of equity markets, as demand for dividend information should increase as investors 
obtain a larger proportion of their income from equity markets. We control for the level of dividend 
taxes (Net dividend tax), as timely dividend information is useful in tax planning. Forecasting 
dividends should be more challenging in countries characterized by low Financial transparency, 
low Legal enforcement and high Earnings smoothing, which should stimulate investor demand for 
explicit analyst dividend forecasts. The model also includes year and industry fixed effects, and for 
robustness, we re-estimate Eq. (1) with firm fixed effects.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for variables in Eq. (1) partitioned based on 
the availability of dividend forecasts. The sample includes all dividend payers in the intersection of 
Compustat/Compustat Global and I/B/E/S. Higher volatility in fundamentals should stimulate 
investor demand for analyst dividend forecasts. Indeed, relative to dividend payers without dividend 
forecasts, dividend payers with dividend forecasts exhibit 37% higher dividend volatility (0.006 vs. 
0.008), and 32% and 21% higher earnings and cash flows volatility (0.029 vs. 0.039 and 0.030 vs. 
0.037, respectively). Not surprisingly, dividend volatility is lower than earnings or cash flows 
volatility (all scaled by total assets). In unreported results, the mean (median) coefficient of 
variation is 0.333 (0.249) for dividends versus 0.850 (0.486) for earnings, both exhibiting 
considerable variation.  
Also as predicted, institutional ownership and holdings by pension funds and endowments 
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are higher for firms with dividend forecasts, consistent with institutional demand for dividend 
forecasts. Dividend forecasts are more common for firms that are larger, with lower book-to-market 
ratios, with higher profitability, and in countries with higher dividend taxes. Dividend forecasts are 
also more frequent for firms in countries with lower legal enforcement and lower financial 
transparency, where investors suffer from asymmetric information (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003; 
Tucker and Zarowin 2006). Panel B reports Pearson correlations between variables and we note that 
these conform to expectations. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Panel C of Table 3 presents regression estimates for Eq. (1). We also report standardized 
coefficients to facilitate interpretation and comparison of coefficients. The results confirm a positive 
and economically significant association between dividend volatility and analyst propensity to 
report dividend forecasts. A one standard deviation increase in dividend volatility increases the 
likelihood of an analyst dividend forecast by 21% for the model with firm fixed effects. The effect 
of dividend volatility is stronger than that for earnings or cash flow volatility, suggesting dividend 
forecasts are a primary response to dividend variability, not overall business uncertainty.  
We also confirm that analysts are more likely to report dividend forecasts for high 
institutional ownership firms, particularly those with high concentrations of holdings by pension 
funds and endowments. A one standard deviation increase in holdings by pension funds and 
endowments increases the likelihood of analyst dividend forecasts by 25.7% for the model with firm 
fixed effects. Overall, the results in Table 3 are consistent with analysts issuing dividend forecasts 
when investor demand for these forecasts is high.11 
 
11 We also examined whether the availability of analyst dividend forecasts could reflect the presence of management 
dividend guidance. For the full sample, 15.4% of firm-years include earnings guidance, but only 6.4% of firm-years 
include dividend guidance (untabulated). The U.S. exhibits the most prolific earnings guidance, with 35.2% of firm-
years having management earnings forecasts (comparable to 27% in Chuk, Matsumoto and Miller 2013), but only 4.0% 
of firm-years have dividend guidance. Thus, it is unlikely that dividend guidance is the explanation for our results.  
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The accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts compared to time-series dividend estimates 
Together, the evidence presented in Figures 1-2 and Tables 1-3 is consistent with analysts 
responding to investor demand for explicit dividend forecasts that is correlated with dividend 
uncertainty. We next examine properties of analyst dividend forecasts. Investors will demand 
dividend forecasts only if they are informative and more accurate compared to alternative forecasts. 
Thus, our next set of tests examines the accuracy of dividend forecasts relative to other possible 
(time-series) expectations. We expect the rise in the availability of dividend forecasts we document 
to be associated with these forecasts being more accurate than time-series based extrapolations. 
However, this prediction is not obvious given the association between dividend forecast availability 
and dividend volatility (i.e., suggesting forecasting is more difficult), along with prior research 
indicating time-series estimates are sometimes more accurate than analysts’ forecasts (Bradshaw et 
al. 2012).  
We first calculate analysts’ dividend per share (FDPS) forecast errors equal to the absolute 
difference between the actual and forecasted dividend for the fiscal year t+1, scaled by the stock 




Panel A of Table 4 reports the average (unsigned) error of analyst dividend forecasts for individual 
countries using all forecasts issued by analysts for dividend paying firms in a fiscal year. Across the 
16 countries, the mean dividend forecast error is 0.76% (of share price).12 Analysts in Japan exhibit 
the lowest error (0.19%), which likely reflects dividend guidance in Japan (Conroy et al. 2000). 
Analysts in Finland and Australia have the highest forecast errors (1.25% and 1.21%, 
 
12 Call, Hewitt, Watkins and Yohn (2020) find that EPS forecast accuracy improves for more recent vintages of I/B/E/S 
data, consistent with coverage bias by I/B/E/S. We compared a 2-year earlier vintage of our data, and found small 
decreases in dividend forecast errors across overlapping periods in the two samples (0.79% using the earlier vintage vs. 
0.76% in Table 4). Nevertheless, conclusions from other tests are unaffected when using the earlier vintage data. The 
small impact in our setting likely reflects the fact that the Call et al. (2020) results are concentrated in “younger, less 
followed firms with lower profits and stronger earnings growth” (p. 2), which are less likely to be reflected in our 




[Insert Table 4 around here] 
To put the dividend forecast error results into perspective, we also tabulate the average 
(unsigned) error of analysts’ cash flow (FCFPS error) and earnings (FEPS error) forecasts, with 
forecast errors calculated similarly to dividend forecast errors.14 Mean cash flow forecast error is 
5.28% of share price, 2.6 times higher than mean earnings forecast error of 2.06% (the ratio of cash 
flow to earnings forecast errors is comparable to approximately 3 in Givoly et al. 2009).  
The forecasting process for dividends is fundamentally different from that for earnings and 
cash flows, so the comparative evidence in Table 4 is descriptive and cannot speak to the relative 
quality of analyst dividend forecasts.15 This motivates our next test that compares the accuracy of 
analyst dividend forecasts to the accuracy of dividend estimates based on common time-series 
approaches and to transformations of analyst EPS estimates. We use six time-series dividend 
forecasts that are common in the literature (Shevlin 1982; Yoon and Starks 1995; Liu et al. 2002; 
Botosan and Plumlee 2005), which are labeled Naïve DPS 1-6 and defined in the Appendix. We 
primarily focus on the simplest forecast (based on a random walk, Naïve DPS 1). We compute 
forecast errors in a similar way to the analyst dividend forecast error.  
Panel A of Table 5 reports mean and standard deviation of absolute forecast errors for the six 
 
13 Low dividend forecast accuracy in Finland can be attributed to the 2005 dividend tax increase from 29% to 40.5%, 
followed by changes in dividends (Kari, Karikallio and Pirttila 2009; Liljeblom 2008). The dividend imputation tax 
system in Australia, where the corporate tax is passed through to investors as “franking” credits attached to dividends, 
tends to increase dividend variability as firms optimize frequency and magnitudes of dividend payments, and analysts 
must anticipate these changes (Pattenden and Twite 2008; McClure et al. 2018). 
14 We also examined dividend forecast bias (i.e., signed error). Compared to the significant optimism in analyst EPS 
forecasts (Francis and Philbrick 1993; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002), we find little evidence of optimism in analyst 
dividend forecasts. The average bias is small and, in five countries (including the U.S.), average dividend forecasts are 
actually slightly pessimistic. 
15 Our mean EPS forecast error of 2.06% is close to the average EPS forecast error of 2.56% in Bilinski, Lyssimachou 
and Walker (2013); the mean cash flow forecast error for U.S. firms of 4.12% is close to 3.68% in Call et al. (2013). The 
DPS forecast errors are similar to evidence in Brown, Clarke, How, and Lim (2002) and Brown, How and Verhoeven 
(2008). In untabulated results, the correlation between dividend and earnings forecast errors is 0.35, suggesting dividend 
forecasts are unlikely to reflect mechanical payout-ratio-adjusted EPS forecasts. The correlation between dividend and 
cash flow forecasts errors is 0.33. 
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time-series dividend forecasts. Random walk forecasts, Naïve DPS 1, have the lowest error, and 
Naïve DPS 6 forecasts (that assume growth in dividends) have the next lowest error. Shevlin (1982) 
also finds that random walk dividend forecasts exhibit lower error compared to the Lintner model in 
predicting dividends for Australian firms. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the mean difference between the error in analyst dividend 
forecasts and the error of each time-series dividend forecast. Consistent with Panel A, analyst 
dividend forecasts are more accurate than all models. To provide economic significance, the last 
column reports the percentage difference between mean analyst forecast error, 𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑆 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , and the 
mean random walk dividend forecast error, 𝑁𝑎ï𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑃𝑆 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, the time-series forecast closest in 
accuracy to analyst dividend forecasts. The mean percentage difference is −45.9%, consistent with 
analyst forecasts being materially more accurate than time-series estimates.16 Overall, analysts’ 
dividend forecasts are superior to those from common time-series models or transformation of 
analyst EPS forecasts, which supports the inference that investors demand analyst dividend forecasts 
given their superiority to alternatives. These results also suggest analyst do more than rely on 
extrapolative models to forecast dividends considering that the incremental accuracy of analyst 
dividend forecasts over time-series estimates is significant.  
In untabulated analyses, we performed two tests. First, we examine whether analysts are able 
to predict dividend initiations and omissions, which is not possible with time-series models. We find 
that analysts do not report dividend forecasts in the year of omission for 45.0% of firms that will 
 
16 Table 5 may capture instances where firms omit or initiate dividend payments, which can negatively affect the 
observed accuracy of dividend forecasts from time-series models. To address this concern, in unreported results, we find 
that analysts consistently and significantly outperform time-series dividend estimates for firms with continuous dividend 
payments over the past ten years. Moreover, analyst dividend forecasts issued in the first quarter of the fiscal year are 
more accurate than any of the time-series estimates, suggesting that conclusions in Table 5 are not driven by more 
accurate forecasts issued close to fiscal year-end. These conclusions are unchanged when we substitute the earliest 
dividend forecast per firm-analyst-year. 
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omit, and forecast a zero dividend for 24.3% of the remaining firms. For initiations, 42.0% of firms 
have a dividend forecast in the year the firm ultimately initiates a dividend. Of firms that omit 
dividends, only 3.3% issue public dividend guidance in the omission year, and of dividend initiating 
firms, only 0.7% provide dividend guidance in the year of dividend initiation. Thus, it is unlikely 
that public dividend guidance explains analysts’ ability to predict dividend initiations and omissions. 
For dividend omissions, managers forecast, on average, positive dividends during the year the 
dividend is ultimately omitted, suggesting these dividend omissions are even a surprise to them.17 
Second, we compare the accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts to management dividend 
guidance. At the country-level, there is on average no significant difference between the accuracy of 
analyst and management dividend forecasts, similar to the findings for EPS forecasts in Ruland 
(1978). The main caveat to this test is small sample size, as 11 of 16 countries in the sample have 
less than 100 management dividend forecasts.   
IV. INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND FORECAST REVISIONS 
The results presented in the previous section demonstrate that (i) many firms initiated 
dividend payments during the 2000s (Table 1), (ii) the availability of dividend forecasts has 
increased (Figure 1; Table 2), (iii) dividends are not sticky but volatile (Figure 2), (iv) dividend 
forecasts are more likely for firms with higher dividend volatility (Table 3), and (v) dividend 
forecast errors seem relatively small, and analysts significantly outperform extrapolative alternatives 
(Tables 4-5). Together, the evidence is consistent with analysts responding to investor demand for 
dividend forecasts. However, even the most accurate dividend forecasts may be of little usefulness if 
 
17 In our sample, the unconditional probability a firm will initiate or omit dividend is 12.0% and 12.4%, respectively. 
Analysts correctly identify over 42% of firms that eventually initiate or omit dividends, which strikes us as significant. 
This ability fares well compared to prior research, including Cotter et al. (2019), who model the likelihood of dividend 
initiations and omissions and report an average propensity score of 9.13% (8.86%) for dividend initiating (omitting) 
firms. Similarly, Allen and Michaely (1995) report an average of 17% of U.S. dividend payers omit a dividend, 
Dewenter and Warther (1998) report dividend omissions of 10.9% in Japan, and Benito and Young (2003) document an 
average of 11% of U.K. payers omitting a dividend.  
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they do not convey timely or new information useful to investors. For example, the usefulness of 
analyst dividend forecasts may ultimately be small if other information crowds out the information 
contained in them. Analogously, Bilinski (2014) finds no evidence that analysts’ cash flow forecast 
revisions convey incremental information after controlling for revisions in earnings forecasts, target 
prices and stock recommendations. This section presents short-window price reaction tests to 
examine the incremental information content of dividend forecast announcements.  
We highlight three reasons for why dividend forecast revisions may be incrementally 
associated with market reactions compared to other analyst forecasts. First, investor demand for 
dividend-paying stocks exerts price pressure in response to dividend news. For example, 
institutional investors exhibit a well-documented preference for dividend-paying stocks (Dimson et 
al. 2008; Del Guercio 1996; Schanzenbach and Sitkoff 2007; Gompers and Metrick 2001; Bennett et 
al. 2003; Grinstein and Michaely 2005; and Harris et al. 2015). Second, dividend forecast revisions 
could interact with concurrent revisions in forecasted earnings as an indicator of earnings quality 
(Bhattacharya 1979; John and Williams 1985; Ofer and Thakor 1987; Skinner and Soltes 2011). 
Third, dividend forecasts can reveal the relative quality of target prices as they do for earnings 
quality. Large positive target price revisions accompanied by large positive dividend forecast 
revisions should be associated with attenuated price reactions (i.e., overly optimistic target prices).18 
 
18 A significant positive revision in both a target price and a dividend forecast could imply a material increase in the 
expected total return, but this scenario should be, on average, less likely given that equity premia have been declining 
over time (Blanchard 1993; Jagannathan, McGrattan, and Scherbina 2000; Fama and French 2002). To formalize our 
prediction, consider the expected equity return 𝐸(𝑟𝑡) =
𝑇𝑃+𝐸(𝐷𝑡)
𝑃𝑡
, where 𝐸(𝑟𝑡) is the expected total return, 
𝑇𝑃
𝑃𝑡
 is the 
expected capital gain and 
𝐸(𝐷𝑡)
𝑃𝑡
 is the forward dividend yield. For sake of exposition, consider the combination of 
∆𝐸(𝑟𝑡) ≤ 0 and 
∆𝑇𝑃
𝑃𝑡
≥0, which would imply 
∆𝐸(𝐷𝑡)
𝑃𝑡
≤0. Thus, a zero change or declining expected return associated with 






, or both are 
optimistic. As dividend forecast accuracy is easier to measure and certainly higher than accuracy of target prices, it is 
difficult for analysts to use dividend forecasts to channel well-documented optimistic bias compared to target prices 
(Bradshaw, Brown and Huang 2013; and Bilinski et al. 2013). Thus, when the expected return is either constant or 
declining, investors are more likely to infer that a positive target price revision issued jointly with a positive dividend 
forecast revision is excessively optimistic. 
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We operationalize these possibilities by regressing three-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR), centered on the dividend forecast announcement date, on dividend forecast (ΔFDPS) and 
other revisions:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Δ𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛼2Δ𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑆 + 𝛼3Δ𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆 × Δ𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑆 + 𝛼4Δ𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑆 + 𝛼5𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +
𝛼6𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛼7Δ𝑇𝑃 + 𝛼8Δ𝑇𝑃 × Δ𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑆 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜉. 
(2) 
For U.S. stocks, we use the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark to measure abnormal 
returns when calculating CAR. For non-U.S. stocks, we use the main index of the exchange where 
the firm’s stock lists. The regression controls for earnings forecast revisions (ΔFEPS), and we 
interact dividend and earnings forecasts revisions, ΔFEPS×ΔFDPS, to capture the possibility that 
positive dividend forecast revisions are incrementally informative about current earnings quality 
(which is a prelude to our analysis of dividend signaling in the next section). To control for 
simultaneous revisions in analyst’s stock recommendations, we include two indicator variables for 
directional recommendation revisions, Upgrade, and Downgrade. The model includes target price 
revisions (ΔTP) and an interaction term, ΔTP×ΔFDPS, to test whether dividend revisions reinforce 
the information in target price forecasts. We also include controls from Eq. (1) and year and 
industry fixed effects, and alternatively, firm fixed effects. We expect the coefficients 𝛼2 and 𝛼3 to 
be positive and 𝛼8 to be negative if dividend forecast revisions have incremental information 
content and help validate other revisions.19 
Panel A of Table 6 reports average CAR for dividend forecast announcements across sample 
countries split by positive and negative dividend forecast revisions. The mean positive dividend 
revision is 0.41% (of share price) and is associated with a positive market reaction of 0.62%. The 
 
19 We use the U.S. and international versions of the broker translation file to match broker names between target price 
and EPS files. The broker translation file is from 2005, which eliminates broker houses covered by I/B/E/S after that 
date (9.6% of target price attrition). Similar to Keung (2010), we consider reiterations of EPS, cash flow, target prices 
and stock recommendations if dividend forecasts are issued without those revisions.  
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mean negative dividend revision is −0.52% and is associated with a price reaction of −0.60%.   
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
To test for an incremental price effect of dividend forecast revisions, Model 1 in Panel B of 
Table 6 reports regression results for Eq. (2) without interaction terms, but controls for other factors. 
Results indicate that a one standard deviation revision in dividend forecasts is associated with a 
5.2% stronger price reaction. For comparison, a one standard deviation increase in earnings (cash 
flow) forecast revisions is associated with an 8.1% (2.7%) stronger price reaction (similar to Call et 
al. 2013 and Givoly et al. 2009). Significant associations between stock prices and dividend forecast 
revisions suggest analyst dividend forecasts are not simple transformations of other information. 
Models 2 and 3 document significant positive coefficients on the interaction term ΔFEPS x 
ΔFDPS, suggesting an interactive effect between dividend and earnings forecast revisions and 
returns. Such an effect is consistent with higher earnings quality (Ertimur, Livnat, and Martikainen 
2003), which we examine further in the next section. Further, the coefficient on the interaction 
ΔTP×ΔFDPS is negative in Models 2 and 3, consistent with dividend forecasts helping unravel 
excessively optimistic target prices.20  
In untabulated results, we perform four additional tests. First, we estimate Eq. (2) excluding 
a ten-day window centered on annual and quarterly earnings announcements to reduce the impact of 
confounding events, with conclusions identical to those in Table 6. Second, we estimate Eq. (2) 
using only observations where the analyst concurrently revises all forecasts, with similar results. 
Third, we re-estimate Eq. (2) for U.S. and non-U.S. firms separately and find significant coefficients 
on dividend revisions and their interaction terms in both samples. Finally, we augment Eq. (2) with 
 
20 A caveat is that a small revision in a target price along with an increase in a dividend forecast can signal a firm with 
better prospects. In untabulated results, we find that small TP revisions accompanied by positive dividend forecast 
revisions are indeed associated with higher returns. In contrast, high TP revisions accompanied by positive dividend 
forecast revisions are associated with lower returns, consistent with Table 6. 
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interaction terms between dividend forecast revisions and the four country-level variables from Eq. 
(1). We find incremental price reactions to dividend forecast revisions in countries where equity 
markets are more important, dividend taxes are higher, and earnings smoothing is lower. 
V. THE USEFULNESS OF ANALYST DIVIDEND FORECASTS: DIVIDEND 
SIGNALING AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR HOLDINGS 
Our final analyses examine two specific uses of analyst dividend forecasts. First, we extend 
the results in Table 6 suggesting dividend forecasts can be helpful in assessing the quality of current 
period reported earnings by focusing on joint dividend and earnings announcements (i.e., surprises) 
and whether dividend surprises are associated with future earnings growth. Second, we relate 
analyst dividend forecast revisions to changes in institutional investors’ holdings.  
Dividend signaling and future earnings growth 
Dividend signaling models suggest firms increase dividends when they expect higher future 
earnings (Bhattacharya 1979; John and Williams 1985; Ofer and Thakor 1987; Skinner and Soltes 
2011). Thus, consistent with the results in Table 6 regarding the reinforcing information in dividend 
and earnings forecast revisions, positive earnings surprises accompanied by positive dividend 
surprises should indicate more sustainable earnings than positive earnings news absent positive 
dividend news, and vice versa. However, previous studies, using actual dividend changes (which 
implicitly assumes a random walk expectation model), often find weak or no support for the 
dividend signaling hypothesis (see Grullon et al. (2005) for the U.S.; Conroy et al. (2000) and 
Fukuda (2000) for Japan; Chen, Firth and Gao (2002) for China; Abeyratna and Power (2002) for 
the U.K.; and Andres et al. (2013) for Germany). Valuation theory and researchers frequently 
advocate cash flows as a basis for assessing earnings quality (e.g., Ali 1994; Dechow 1994; Penman 
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2009), but whether investors use dividends to assess quality of earnings is an open question.21 In this 
section, we first examine the association between joint dividend and earnings information and 
announcement returns, followed by an analysis of future earnings growth (consistent with a similar 
analysis of cash flows in Brown, Huang and Pinello 2013).  
Similar to prior research (e.g., Ertimur et al. 2003), earnings surprise (UE) is the price-scaled 
difference between the actual EPS and the mean of analysts’ last EPS forecasts available at the end 
of a fiscal year. Similarly, the dividend surprise (UD) is the difference between the actual dividend 
and the mean of analyst’s last dividend forecasts at the end of a fiscal year. UE and UD capture 
unexpected earnings and dividend news revealed at the joint preliminary earnings and dividend 
announcements. An interaction term, 𝑈𝐸 × 𝑈𝐷, tests whether investors interpret reported earnings 
relative to reported dividends. We then use a regression model to relate dividend and earnings 
surprises to three-day cumulative abnormal returns centered on the joint earnings and dividend 
announcements, CAR_Earn, 
𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 = 𝜓0 + 𝜓1𝑈𝐸 + 𝜓2𝑈𝐷 + 𝜓3𝑈𝐸 × 𝑈𝐷 + 𝜓4𝑈𝐶𝐹 + 𝜓5𝑈𝐸 × 𝑈𝐶𝐹 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + ϛ. 
(3) 
Consistent with prior research (Ball and Brown 1968; Chari, Jagannathan and Ofer 1988; Easton and 
Zmijewski 1989; Gennotte and Truemann 1996), we expect a positive earnings response coefficient, 
ψ1. Higher than anticipated dividend payouts will affect portfolio decisions of dividend-oriented 
investors, thus we expect ψ2 to be positive. The coefficient ψ3 should be positive if investors use 
dividend forecasts to assess the quality of reported earnings. Eq. (3) also includes the cash flow 
surprise, UCF, and its interaction with the earnings surprise, UCF×UE, as investors may also use 
 
21 We find this especially interesting because 98.9% of dividend announcements in our sample are made jointly with 
earnings announcements, and less than 0.2% of cases include managers announcing dividends before earnings. Chen et 
al. (2002) also report that firms in commonwealth countries announce dividends at the same time as earnings. Dividends 
and earnings are announced jointly in Japan (Conroy et al. 2000), Hong Kong (Cheng, Fung and Leung 2007), Australia 
(Easton 1991), Austria (Schleicher, Gurgul and Mestel 2003) and Germany (Andres et al. 2013). Aharony and Swary 
(1980, p. 3) report that for U.S. firms, “[A] major difficulty [in assessing dividend information content] lies in the fact 
that quarterly earnings and dividend figures often are released to the public at approximately the same time.”  
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cash flow forecasts to gauge current earnings quality. Controls are from Eq. (1), and we also include 
industry and year fixed effects or firm fixed effects. 
If dividend surprises are on average zero, Eq. (3) will have low power to detect whether 
investors use analyst-based dividend surprises to interpret earnings news. However, Figure 3 shows 
that, on average, actual dividends exceed analyst dividend forecasts 42% of the time. Only 18% of 
firms across sample countries exactly meet analysts’ dividend forecasts, and the remainder fall short 
of expectations.  
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
Model 1 in Panel A of Table 7 reports results for Eq. (3) without interaction terms. The 
coefficient on the dividend surprise is positive and economically significant. A one standard 
deviation increase in UD leads to a 7.3% higher price reaction around earnings announcements. For 
comparison, a one standard deviation increase in UE (UCF) is associated with a 6.1% (3.2%) higher 
price reaction. In Model 2, the coefficient on the interaction term UE×UD is positive, consistent 
with investors using analyst-based dividend surprises to interpret the information in current earning 
surprises. In contrast, the interaction term UE×UCF is zero.22 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
Eq. (3) examines dividend surprises (based on analyst forecasts), in contrast to the use of 
dividend changes in prior research (Lang and Litzenberger 1989; Michaely et al. 1995; Koch and 
Sun 2004). To examine which construct is more associated with pricing, Model 3 presents results 
from regressing abnormal announcement returns on UE, UCF and change in dividends, ΔDiv, which 
is the price-scaled difference between the current and previous dividend per share (effectively a 
random walk forecast error). Consistent with prior research (Kane et al. 1984), we find a positive 
 
22 In unreported results, we find that our conclusions from Eq. (3) remain qualitatively the same if we scale earnings and 
dividend surprises by the standard deviation of analyst earnings and dividend forecasts, respectively.  
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coefficient on ΔDiv. However, Model 4 indicates that controlling for dividend forecast surprises, 
ΔDiv is not associated with announcement returns. 
As a direct test of whether investors react more strongly to reinforcing dividend news, we 
create four indicator variables to capture combinations of dividend and earnings surprises:  
1. UE+UD+ = 1 if the firm beats both dividend and earnings expectations, zero otherwise; 
2. UE+UD− = 1 if the firm beats earnings expectations only, zero otherwise; 
3. UE−UD+ = 1 if the firm beats dividend expectations only, zero otherwise; 
4. UE−UD− = 1 if the firm beats neither dividend nor earnings expectations, zero otherwise. 
We then include the four indicator variables in Eq. (3) instead of UD and UE×UD. If investors price 
the information in analysts’ dividend forecasts, we expect a higher positive coefficient on UE+UD+ 
than on UE+UD−, because the former signals more persistent earnings news. We also expect 
investors to react less negatively to firms that report negative earnings news but a positive dividend 
surprise (UE−UD+), compared to cases where both earnings and dividends disappoint (UE−UD−). 
Although it is not surprising that two positive (or two negative) surprises are associated with 
stronger market reactions than one alone, these tests help understand how investors price surprises 
based on dividend forecasts. 
The last columns of Table 7, Panel A report regression results with the four indicator 
variables, and Panel B tests equality of coefficients on the indicator variables. Investors react more 
strongly for a firm reporting both positive earnings and positive dividend news relative to a firm 
reporting positive earnings news accompanied by negative dividend news. Further, negative price 
reactions to negative earnings news are moderated when accompanied by positive dividend news. 
Together, these results are consistent with analyst forecast-based dividend surprises (i) helping 
investors interpret current earnings news and (ii) signaling incremental information to earnings and 
cash flow news that is potentially informative about future earnings.  
To corroborate the conclusion that investors use dividend surprises based on analyst 
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forecasts to interpret earnings news, we formally examine whether dividends provide a signal about 
future earnings by examining the likelihood of future growth in earnings, conditional on the sign of 
dividend and earnings surprises in the current period. This evidence is important considering that 
previous studies find little support for the association between current dividend changes and future 
earnings (DeAngelo et al. 1996; Benartzi et al. 1997; Allen and Michaely 2003). The model 
specification for positive future earnings growth is: 
𝑃(𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)


















− + 𝜒9𝑈𝐶𝐹 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝑒𝑡+1. 
(4) 
The dependent variable equals 1 if next fiscal year EPS is higher than current period EPS and 0 
otherwise.23 Eq. (4) includes four indicator variables to capture combinations of earnings surprises 
and dividend surprises formed from analyst forecasts, and four indicator variables to capture 
combinations of earnings surprises and dividend changes. We control for cash flow news and 
include controls from Eq. (1) and industry and year fixed effects or firm fixed effects.  
In Panel A of Table 8, the coefficient on UE+UD+ is positive and larger than that for 
UE+UD− (see Panel B for the relevant chi-square test), which supports the prediction that firms that 
beat both dividend and earnings expectations signal more persistent future earnings than those that 
beat earnings but miss dividend expectations. Further, we find more negative coefficients on 
UE−UD− relative to UE−UD+, consistent with negative dividend and earnings surprises sending 
strong negative signals about future earnings growth.24 The interesting result is that conditional on 
the sign of UE, the association with future earnings growth tracks the sign of UD. For example, the 
 
23 We also examine associations with next period earnings surprises (DeAngelo et al. 1996), and the results are 
qualitatively similar but less strong, which is not surprising given that analysts can change earnings expectations based 
on the information content of dividend news.   
24 Our conclusions from Table 8 are unchanged if we include future earnings surprises as an explanatory variable in Eq. 
(4) to capture the extent to which future earnings surprises are anticipated by the market at the time current earnings and 
dividends are announced (Koch and Sun 2004).  
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coefficient on UE−UD+ is positive, whereas the coefficient on UE+UD− is negative. Actual dividend 
changes are not associated with future earnings growth, consistent with Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989), DeAngelo et al. (1996) and Benartzi et al. (1997).25  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
The coefficients on UE−UD− and UE+UD− are not significantly different. The coefficient on 
UE+UD− is higher than on UE−UD+, consistent with investors attaching more weight to the more 
persistent dividend signal for future earnings (Ertimur et al. 2003). Together, Tables 7 and 8 
corroborate the importance to investors of dividend expectations in understanding implications of 
current earnings for future earnings and growth.   
Institutional holdings and analyst dividend forecasts 
Our last analysis examines whether changes in institutional investor holdings are associated 
with analyst dividend forecast revisions. Specifically, we examine the association between changes 
in the next quarter institutional holdings for a firm, ΔIOQ+1, and mean quarterly changes in analysts’ 
annual dividend forecasts, ΔFDPSQ, measured in the current quarter. For each analyst following a 
firm in a fiscal year, we calculate the dividend revision as the price-scaled difference between the 
last forecast issued in each of the current and previous quarters. We then average revisions made in 
each firm-quarter to calculate ΔFDPSQ. We control for quarterly changes in annual earnings 
forecasts (ΔFEPSQ), target prices (ΔTPQ), and stock recommendations (UpgradeQ and DowngradeQ) 
as these can affect portfolio allocation decisions.  
We control for actual dividend announcements in quarter +1 in the absence of analyst 
dividend forecast revisions in the previous quarter (ΔDivQ+1), as investors may revise their holdings 
in response to changes in actual dividends. This result helps us establish whether, unconditionally 
 
25 In untabulated results, we estimated Eq. (4) with only dividend changes and control variables and continue to find that 
actual dividend changes are not associated with future earnings growth. 
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on the availability of analyst dividend forecasts, dividend information affects investors’ portfolio 
allocation decisions. We also control for actual dividend announcements in quarter +1 conditional 
on analyst dividend forecast revisions in the previous quarter (ΔDivQ+1_|_ΔFDPSQ) to capture 
whether investors rely less on actual dividend changes if these have been preceded by analyst 
dividend forecasts (as in Table 8). The model includes firm controls from Eq. (1) and industry and 
year fixed effects:  
∆𝐼𝑂𝑄+1 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1𝛥𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑄 + 𝜅2𝛥𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑄 + 𝜅3𝛥𝑇𝑃𝑄 + 𝜅4𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑄 + 𝜅5𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑄
+ 𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑄+1 + 𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑄+1| 𝛥𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑄 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜄 
(5) 
In Table 9, we confirm a positive association between analyst dividend forecast revisions 
and changes in institutional ownership. A one standard deviation increase in ΔFDPSQ is associated 
with a 2.3% increase in institutional holdings next quarter. For comparison, a one standard deviation 
increase in ΔFEPSQ is associated with a 2.1% increase in institutional holdings. Cash flow forecast 
revisions are not associated with changes in institutional holdings. Finally, the last column of Table 
9 shows that changes in pension fund and endowment ownership are only associated with dividend 
forecast revisions. Our conclusions are unchanged when we re-do the analysis with firm fixed 
effects (result untabulated).  
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
Actual dividend announcements that are not preceded by analyst dividend forecast revisions 
are statistically and economically associated with changes in institutional holdings. This result is 
consistent with investors factoring dividend information into portfolio allocation decisions. 
However, this effect is eliminated if analysts revise their dividend forecasts before dividend 
announcements. Jointly, the results suggest that dividend announcements are not associated with 
changes in institutional investors’ holdings when preceded by analyst dividend forecasts revisions, 




This study documents that analysts routinely produce dividend forecasts, which we argue 
reflects analysts supplying dividend estimates in response to investor demand for dividend 
expectations, driven by variability in dividend payments across firms. Analysts’ dividend forecasts 
are superior to alternative extrapolative forecasts, and exhibit incremental explanatory power for 
stock prices beyond that contained in earnings and cash flow forecasts, target prices and stock 
recommendations. Finally, an analysis of joint dividend and earnings announcement returns 
suggests investors use analyst dividend forecasts in assessing the quality of earnings news and 
expectations of future earnings, and dividend forecasts are associated with changes in institutional 
investor holdings. In contrast to views in accounting and finance research that dividends are being 
displaced by repurchases, our results suggest a growing importance of dividends and dividend 
expectations.  
Our study is of interest to investors, managers and academics. First, the results are important 
to dividend-oriented investors, who stand to improve portfolio allocation decisions by relying on 
readily available analyst dividend forecasts, rather than relying on inferior extrapolative estimates. 
Such investors include individual and institutional investors seeking dividend income (Hartzmark 
and Solomon 2013; 2019), but also funds specialized in dividend capture strategies that rotate 
between stocks to capture up to six dividends a year (Dubofsky 1987). Further, our results are 
important for index futures arbitrage, equity option valuation, and index option portfolio 
management, as dividends ultimately affect settlement prices.  
A question for future research is why investors demand forecasts of dividends but not of 
stock repurchases? Survey evidence suggests managers consider undervaluation a primary reason 
for share repurchase announcements (Brav et al. 2005). Repurchases might be a noisy signal of 
future earnings given that a firm has no binding obligation to repurchase stock, repurchase programs 
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tend to have long horizons, and the exact timing of repurchase transactions are unknown ex ante 
(Dittmar and Field 2015). Currently, studies find little support for a repurchase signaling hypothesis 
(Bartov 1991; Grullon and Michaely 2004; Lie 2005). Moreover, repurchases are relatively 
uncommon outside the U.S. (von Eije and Megginson 2008; Lee and Suh 2011). Nevertheless, given 
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Definitions of the variables used in the study 
 
Variable Definition 
Main dependent variables 
Div forecast An indicator variable equal to 1 if there is at least one dividend forecast for a firm in a fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
CAR Three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the dividend forecast announcement day.  




Growth in EPS indicator, which is equal to 1 if next fiscal year EPS is higher than current 
period EPS, and 0 otherwise. 
ΔIOQ+1 Changes in quarterly institutional holdings for a stock. 
Δ#investors Changes in the quarterly number of institutional investors. 
Δ% pension funds Changes in quarterly percentage institutional ownership by pension funds and endowments. 
Firm characteristics 
Dividend STD   Standard deviation of asset-scaled dividend measured over the previous five years.  
Earnings STD Standard deviation of asset-scaled income before extraordinary items measured over the 
previous five years.  
Cash Flow STD Standard deviation of asset-scaled operating cash flows measured over the previous five years.  
IO Institutional ownership for a stock measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year (sourced 
from Ferreira and Matos 2008 and updated to 2013).  
% pension funds The proportion of institutional holdings held by pension funds and endowments measured at the 
end of the most recent fiscal year (sourced from Ferreira and Matos 2008 and updated to 2013). 
MV (USD) Firm market capitalization expressed in USD million using the exchange rate from 31 
December 2005 and measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year.  
B/M The book-to-market ratio calculated as the ratio of book value of common equity to market 
capitalization measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year.   
Loss An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reports negative income before extraordinary items 
and 0 otherwise. Loss is measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year 
ROA Return on assets measured as a ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets 
measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year. 
Forecast characteristics 
FDPS error Dividend forecast error, which is the absolute difference between the actual and the forecasted 
dividend per share scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
FEPS error  Earnings forecast error, which is the absolute difference between the actual and the forecasted 
EPS scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
FCFPS error  Cash flow forecast error, which is the absolute difference between the actual and the forecasted 
cash flow per-share scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
Naïve DPS error Naïve dividend forecast error, which is the absolute difference between the actual dividend and 
the time-series dividend forecast expressed on a per share basis and scaled by the stock price at 
the end of the previous fiscal year 
Naïve DPS 1 Naïve dividend per share forecast, where the next year dividend equals the previous dividend. 
Naïve DPS 2 Naïve dividend per share forecast equal to the product of the mean payout ratio calculated over 
the previous seven years and net income for the previous fiscal year. 
Naïve DPS 3 Naïve dividend per share forecast equal to the product of the target payout ratio estimated from 
the Lintner model and net income for the previous fiscal year. 
Naïve DPS 4 Naïve dividend per share forecast equal to the product of the target payout ratio estimated from 
the Lintner model and the analyst EPS forecast. 
Naïve DPS 5 Naïve dividend per share forecast predicted from the Lintner model. 
Naïve DPS 6 Naïve dividend per share forecast equal to the product of the previous year dividend per share 
times 1+ the growth in DPS calculated over the prior two years. 
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ΔFDPS Dividend forecast revision calculated as the difference between the analyst’s current and 
previous dividend forecast for a firm and fiscal year. We scale this difference by the stock price 
at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
ΔFEPS Earnings forecast revision calculated as the difference between the analyst’s current and 
previous EPS forecast for a firm and fiscal year. We scale this difference by the stock price at 
the end of the previous fiscal year.  
ΔCEPS Cash flow forecast revision calculated as the difference between the analyst’s current and 
previous cash flow forecast for a firm and fiscal year. We scale this difference by the stock price 
at the end of the previous fiscal year.  
ΔTP Target price revision calculated as the difference between the analyst’s current and previous 
target price for a firm. We scale this difference by the stock price at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. 
Upgrade Stock recommendation upgrade, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an analyst upgrades 
a recommendation for a stock, and 0 otherwise.  
Downgrade Stock recommendation downgrade, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an analyst 
downgrades a recommendation for a stock, and 0 otherwise. 
ΔFDPSQ Mean quarterly revision in analyst dividend forecasts for a firm. Dividend revisions are 
measured as the price-scaled difference between the analyst’s last dividend forecast issued in 
the current quarter and the analyst’s last dividend forecast issued at the end of the previous 
quarter.  
ΔFEPSQ Mean quarterly change in analyst EPS forecasts. EPS revisions are measured as the price-scaled 
difference between the analyst’s last EPS forecast for the current and the previous quarter.  
ΔFCFPSQ Mean quarterly change in analyst cash flow forecasts. Cash flow revisions are measured as the 
price-scaled difference between the analyst’s last cash flow forecast for the current and the 
previous quarter.  
ΔTPQ Mean quarterly change in analyst target prices for a firm. Target price revisions are measured as 
the price-scaled difference between the analyst’s last target price for the current and the 
previous quarter. 
UpgradeQ Consensus stock recommendation upgrade for a quarter, which is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if, on average, analysts upgrade recommendations for a stock in the current compared to the 
previous quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
DowngradeQ Consensus stock recommendation downgrade for a quarter, which is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if, on average, analysts downgrade recommendations for a stock in the current compared to 
the previous quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
UD Dividend surprise calculated as the price-scaled difference between the actual dividend and the 
mean of analysts’ last dividend forecasts available before the annual earnings announcement.  
UE  Earnings surprise calculated as the price-scaled difference between the actual EPS and the mean 
of analysts’ last EPS forecasts available before the annual earnings announcement. 
UCF  Cash flow surprise calculated as the price-scaled difference between the actual cash flow and 
the mean of analysts’ last cash flow forecasts available before the annual earnings 
announcement. 
ΔDiv Price-scaled difference between the actual dividend-per-share for the current and previous fiscal 
year. 
ΔDivQ+1 Price−scaled difference between quarter q+1 announced dividend-per-share and previous fiscal 
year dividend-per-share. ΔDivQ+1 is zero if a firm did not announce a dividend in quarter q+1. 
ΔDivQ+1 | 
ΔFDPSQ 
An interaction variable between ΔDiv Q+1 and an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if 
analysts revise dividend forecasts in the quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
UE+UD+  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm beats both analyst earnings and dividend expectations, 
and 0 otherwise. 
UE+UD− A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm beats earnings expectations, but does not beat analyst 
dividend expectations, and 0 otherwise. 
UE−UD+  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm does not beat earnings expectations, but beats analyst 
dividend expectations, and 0 otherwise. 
UE−UD−  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm fails to beat both analyst earnings and dividend 





Country and other characteristics 
Importance of 
equity markets  
The mean rank across three variables used in La Porta et al. (2000): (1) the ratio of the 
aggregate stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross national product, (2) the 
number of listed domestic firms relative to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs relative 
to the population (sourced from Leuz et al. 2003).  
Net dividend tax The top marginal statutory personal income tax rate imposed on dividend income after taking 
account imputation systems, tax credits, and tax allowances (sourced from Ferreira, Massa and 
Matos 2010).  
Legal 
enforcement 
Legal enforcement measured as the mean score across (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, 
(2) an assessment of rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from 
zero to ten (sourced from Leuz et al. 2003).  
Financial 
transparency  
The financial transparency index defined as a relative measure of the availability of financial 
information to those outside the firm due to disclosure, interpretation, and dissemination of 
financial information by firms, financial analysts, and media reporters (sourced from Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith 2004).  
Earnings 
smoothing 
Earnings smoothing is the country’s median ratio of the firm-level standard deviations of 
operating income and operating cash flow, both scaled by lagged total assets. The cash flow 
from operations is equal to operating income minus accruals, where accruals are calculated as: 
(Δtotal current assets – Δcash) – (Δtotal current liabilities – Δshort-term debt – Δtaxes payable) 
– depreciation expense (sourced from Leuz et al. 2003). 
Year fixed 
effects 
Year dummies for the fiscal years. 
Industry fixed 
effects 





The fraction of dividend payers with analyst dividend forecasts 
 
The figure reports the fraction of dividend payers with available analyst dividend forecasts for (i) the U.S., (ii) Australia, 






The fraction of analysts covering dividend-paying firms with dividend forecasts 
 
The figure reports the fraction of analysts covering dividend-paying firms with available dividend forecasts for (i) the 
















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013




Variability in dividend payments 
 
The figure reports the average fraction of dividend payers that increase, maintain and reduce their annual dividends and 
dividend payout ratios. Fig. 2a reports the average fraction of dividend payers across countries that increase, maintain 
and reduce their annual dividend-per-share (DPS) compared to the previous fiscal year. Reported actual DPS are from 
I/B/E/S and are adjusted for changes in the number of shares outstanding. If the I/B/E/S dividend is missing, we use 
Compustat and Compustat Global dividend information and I/B/E/S number of shares outstanding. Fig. 2b reports the 
fraction of dividend payers across countries that increase, maintain and reduce their annual dividend payout ratio 



































Distribution of dividend surprises 
 
The figure reports the proportion of dividend payers with positive, zero and negative dividend surprises at joint earnings 
and dividend announcements. Dividend surprise is calculated as the price-scaled difference between the actual dividend 
















Positive dividend surprises Zero dividend surprises Negative dividend surprises
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TABLE 1  
Proportion of listed firms with analyst coverage paying dividends per country 
  
AU AT BE DK FI FR DE HK IT JP NL ES SE CH UK US 
2000 71.9% 80.5% 69.0% 73.0% 83.7% 57.8% 41.1% 77.3% 77.1% 82.7% 75.5% 81.6% 64.5% 82.4% 84.3% 21.5% 
2001 77.4% 80.6% 73.0% 74.7% 84.2% 74.6% 58.1% 79.3% 78.3% 87.6% 79.6% 87.1% 77.1% 87.5% 82.8% 21.6% 
2002 75.2% 93.5% 78.8% 78.8% 84.4% 77.2% 65.0% 73.2% 79.6% 87.3% 82.8% 80.0% 70.7% 83.6% 79.3% 35.7% 
2003 81.1% 71.0% 82.1% 91.7% 91.1% 71.5% 61.5% 82.7% 76.8% 90.5% 88.2% 72.0% 82.5% 83.6% 83.6% 37.5% 
2004 81.2% 60.0% 70.5% 79.1% 87.6% 74.7% 72.3% 84.4% 78.3% 90.0% 76.8% 85.9% 78.3% 78.3% 76.1% 36.2% 
2005 81.9% 75.0% 74.4% 83.8% 91.5% 63.4% 67.0% 85.4% 78.2% 92.3% 85.9% 84.4% 79.2% 78.6% 70.6% 35.4% 
2006 78.4% 72.3% 75.9% 84.0% 91.3% 69.2% 63.7% 82.5% 66.7% 92.7% 76.5% 70.0% 75.3% 79.1% 63.9% 43.6% 
2007 82.6% 75.9% 66.7% 83.3% 90.7% 73.3% 65.4% 87.0% 63.5% 94.1% 67.8% 67.6% 80.1% 80.6% 62.9% 41.2% 
2008 79.1% 90.9% 80.6% 78.0% 93.3% 73.5% 68.7% 87.2% 62.4% 95.7% 67.9% 80.0% 83.7% 82.9% 66.4% 47.5% 
2009 82.4% 74.1% 78.7% 70.8% 92.1% 77.2% 64.5% 79.2% 72.5% 96.9% 79.4% 81.0% 76.9% 83.0% 67.2% 51.6% 
2010 80.4% 73.9% 81.7% 69.0% 89.8% 72.3% 67.3% 78.0% 75.1% 96.3% 78.0% 77.2% 80.7% 82.2% 65.3% 57.1% 
2011 73.5% 88.9% 81.9% 74.6% 89.7% 74.5% 75.3% 81.2% 73.4% 97.4% 82.0% 80.8% 78.4% 86.8% 70.2% 56.8% 
2012 71.7% 88.6% 81.0% 77.8% 82.4% 71.1% 75.7% 85.8% 76.2% 96.3% 78.0% 81.8% 79.0% 83.9% 68.2% 59.2% 
2013 71.8% 87.8% 82.4% 74.6% 83.3% 60.5% 67.4% 84.4% 54.3% 96.3% 76.1% 65.6% 69.9% 83.7% 67.4% 57.6% 
 
The table reports the proportion of dividend payers across sixteen countries over the fiscal years 2000–2013. The sample includes firms at the cross-section 
between I/B/E/S (firms with either EPS or dividend forecasts in a fiscal year) and Compustat for U.S. firms and Compustat Global for non-U.S. firms. AU stands 
for Australia, AT for Austria, BE for Belgium, DK for Denmark, FI for Finland, FR for France, DE for Germany, HK for Hong Kong, IT for Italy, JP for 






Descriptive statistics of forecast availability for firms with any analyst coverage 
 





% of Div 
payers with 
Div forecasts 




















Australia 6,927 5,214 75.3% 88.3% 85.4% 15.0 6.0 33.0 15.9 21.8 
Austria 591 472 79.9% 94.1% 75.2% 13.4 6.9 25.9 12.0 15.0 
Belgium 1,140 877 76.9% 90.5% 59.0% 12.7 6.5 29.9 11.2 16.2 
Denmark 997 777 77.9% 84.8% 58.1% 12.6 5.2 33.9 12.5 20.8 
Finland 1,358 1,200 88.4% 93.8% 69.2% 19.0 8.1 48.6 17.9 34.4 
France 5,045 3,561 70.6% 93.5% 71.3% 17.7 7.9 39.9 17.9 22.7 
Germany 5,292 3,439 65.0% 89.1% 70.2% 16.0 8.3 44.8 15.7 26.9 
Hong Kong 4,000 3,290 82.3% 73.5% 63.2% 18.7 8.9 32.8 5.9 13.9 
Italy 2,347 1,680 71.6% 90.4% 55.8% 14.6 7.4 29.7 8.2 16.8 
Japan 23,049 21,124 91.6% 75.1% 54.2% 5.3 3.9 13.8 4.9 9.2 
Netherlands 1,325 1,029 77.7% 90.6% 70.3% 18.1 8.2 40.0 16.3 19.9 
Spain 1,277 997 78.1% 95.0% 54.0% 20.5 10.5 36.9 13.4 18.0 
Sweden 2,394 1,841 76.9% 89.8% 67.0% 14.4 6.5 47.8 20.3 32.9 
Switzerland 1,990 1,641 82.5% 87.9% 75.1% 16.1 6.7 32.0 12.8 18.4 
United Kingdom 12,728 9,032 71.0% 87.9% 50.9% 10.0 5.4 23.8 6.2 11.8 
United States 47,751 20,388 42.7% 82.6% 40.2% 6.7 4.3 35.7 11.2 27.5 
           Average    75.5% 87.9% 63.7% 14.4 6.9 34.3 12.6 20.4 
 
The table reports distributional data of forecast availability for dividend-paying firms in the intersection of I/B/E/S (firms with either EPS or dividend forecasts in 
a fiscal year) and Compustat for U.S. firms and Compustat Global for non-U.S. firms. The #Firm-Years column reports the number of firm-years over fiscal 
years 2000–2013. The #Div payer firm-years column reports the number of firm-years for dividend-paying firms. The %Div payers column reports the 
percentage of dividend payers in all firms covered by analysts. The % of Div payers with Div forecasts column reports the percentage of dividend-paying firms 
with at least one dividend forecast for a firm in a year. The % of Div payers with Div and CFPS forecasts column reports the percentage of dividend-paying 
firms with at least one dividend forecast and one cash flow forecast for a firm in a year. The #Div forecasts per year column reports the average number of 
dividend forecasts for a firm-fiscal year. The #Analysts issuing Div forecasts column reports the average number of analysts issuing dividend forecasts for 
dividend-paying firms. The #EPS forecasts per year, #CFPS forecasts per year and #REV forecasts per year columns report the average number of EPS, cash 
flow and revenue forecasts, respectively, for a firm-fiscal year. 
 




The likelihood of analyst dividend forecasts 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics                
                With dividend forecast (N=34,675)                Without dividend forecast (N=7,220)     




Dividend STD 0.008 0.003 0.037 0.006 0.002 0.020 0.002 0.000 
Earnings STD 0.039 0.020 0.084 0.029 0.017 0.048 0.009 0.000 
Cash Flow STD 0.037 0.023 0.055 0.030 0.020 0.041 0.007 0.000 
IO 0.207 0.121 0.241 0.180 0.046 0.269 0.028 0.000 
% pension funds 0.053 0.022 0.092 0.029 0.000 0.069 0.024 0.000 
MV (USD) 2,119 398 5,532 1,304 182 6,617 814 0.000 
B/M 1.772 0.654 47.609 2.236 0.913 7.799 −0.464 0.088 
Loss dummy 0.119 0.000 0.324 0.122 0.000 0.327 −0.003 0.512 
ROA 0.040 0.039 0.086 0.034 0.028 0.062 0.006 0.000 
Importance of equity markets 19.287 16.800 4.763 18.569 16.800 5.689 0.718 0.000 
Net dividend tax 0.185 0.155 0.085 0.157 0.155 0.071 0.028 0.000 
Legal enforcement 9.282 9.200 0.477 9.303 9.200 0.359 −0.020 0.000 
Financial transparency 0.892 0.684 0.408 0.996 0.684 0.442 −0.105 0.000 
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forecast I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. 
I. 
ln Dividend STD 
0.110              
 0.000 
             
II. 
ln Earnings STD 
0.069 0.508             
 0.000 0.000 
            
III. 
ln Cash Flow STD 
0.066 0.521 0.746            
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           
IV. 
IO 
0.023 −0.018 −0.072 −0.115           
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
V. 
% pension funds 
0.108 0.091 0.023 0.015 0.074          
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
         
VI. 
ln MV (USD) 
0.080 −0.168 −0.253 −0.221 0.192 0.238         
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
VII. 
ln B/M 
−0.159 −0.153 −0.075 −0.117 −0.205 −0.071 −0.147        
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
VIII. 
Loss dummy 
−0.019 0.014 0.268 0.140 −0.029 0.013 −0.115 0.140       
 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 
      
IX. 
ROA 
0.053 0.249 0.002 0.113 0.044 0.014 0.065 −0.226 −0.529      
 0.000 0.000 0.741 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
X. Importance of equity 
markets 
−0.059 0.080 0.047 −0.006 0.320 −0.118 −0.319 −0.111 0.032 0.027     
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
XI. 
Net dividend tax 
0.125 0.392 0.212 0.170 0.094 0.040 −0.235 −0.028 −0.001 0.121 0.171    
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.904 0.000 0.000 
   
XII. 
Legal enforcement 
−0.026 0.100 0.052 0.026 0.198 0.128 0.031 −0.099 0.018 0.042 0.481 0.211   




−0.124 −0.141 −0.228 −0.243 0.579 −0.072 0.215 −0.038 −0.012 −0.040 −0.085 0.058 −0.054  




−0.174 −0.106 −0.209 −0.218 0.628 −0.011 0.149 −0.116 0.001 −0.014 0.521 −0.137 0.272 0.555 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.788 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 




Estimate Std. Estimate p-value Estimate Std. Estimate p-value 
Panel B: Regression results        
ln Dividend STD + 0.177 0.161 0.000 0.146 0.210 0.000 
ln Earnings STD + −0.084 −0.051 0.001 0.088 0.100 0.003 
ln Cash Flow STD + 0.007 0.004 0.819 0.055 0.055 0.096 
IO + 1.762 0.223 0.000 0.679 0.169 0.000 
% pension funds + 1.772 0.088 0.000 2.829 0.257 0.000 
ln MV (USD) + 0.206 0.290 0.000 0.074 0.189 0.000 
ln B/M − −0.780 −0.205 0.000 −0.756 −0.294 0.000 
Loss dummy + 0.236 0.041 0.000 0.033 0.011 0.636 
ROA + −0.472 −0.019 0.144 1.174 0.097 0.000 
Importance of equity markets + 0.056 0.171 0.000    
Net dividend tax + 7.700 0.360 0.000    
Legal enforcement − −0.505 −0.129 0.000    
Financial transparency − −0.956 −0.211 0.000    
Earnings smoothing − −9.058 −0.405 0.000    
Firm fixed effects No    Yes  
 
Year fixed effects Yes    Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes    No   
N 39,428    39,428   
p(Chi2) 0.000    0.000   
Pseudo R2 16.59%       
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for regressors in Eq. (1) split between firms with and without analyst dividend forecasts. The sample includes dividend payers 
on the cross-section between I/B/E/S (firms with either EPS or dividend forecasts in a fiscal year) and Compustat for U.S. firms and I/B/E/S and Compustat 
Global for non-U.S. firms. Mean is the average value, Median, the median, and σ is the standard deviation. Difference in means column reports the difference in 
means between the two groups, and p-value column shows the corresponding p-value. Variables definitions are in the Appendix. Panel B reports Pearson 
correlations between variables in Eq. (1). Panel C reports logistic regression results for Eq. (1). The Std. Estimate column reports standardized estimates for a one 
standard deviation increase in a regressor. The Full model column includes industry and year fixed effects and we omit reporting the intercept. The Firm fixed 
effects column reports results with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are firm-clustered and year dummies account for residual correlation across years (time-
series dependence) and across firms in a given year (cross-section dependence). Industry dummies control for within-industry correlations. Firm effect captures 







Mean dividend forecast error and bias across countries  
   FDPS (unsigned) error FCFPS (unsigned) error FEPS (unsigned) error 
 N Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ 
Australia 68,836 1.21% 2.62% 6.73% 15.54% 2.49% 6.35% 
Austria 5,945 0.61% 0.89% 5.03% 7.35% 2.07% 3.29% 
Belgium 10,096 0.84% 1.71% 3.56% 5.39% 2.08% 3.98% 
Denmark 8,351 0.75% 1.20% 4.97% 9.16% 1.69% 2.72% 
Finland 21,470 1.25% 1.61% 6.01% 9.04% 2.58% 4.71% 
France 59,300 0.52% 0.85% 3.67% 5.23% 1.51% 2.66% 
Germany 49,358 0.60% 0.92% 6.16% 9.16% 2.34% 4.62% 
Hong Kong 45,317 1.08% 2.06% 7.76% 13.46% 2.29% 4.14% 
Italy 22,236 1.01% 1.95% 6.80% 12.36% 2.34% 4.70% 
Japan 83,929 0.19% 0.36% 4.82% 8.41% 2.28% 4.84% 
Netherlands 16,817 0.71% 1.15% 6.52% 11.41% 2.45% 4.66% 
Spain 19,455 0.89% 1.35% 4.96% 6.75% 1.51% 2.55% 
Sweden 23,988 1.05% 2.01% 5.02% 8.24% 2.11% 4.25% 
Switzerland 23,436 0.56% 0.74% 3.10% 4.74% 1.74% 2.81% 
United Kingdom 79,823 0.46% 0.97% 5.31% 7.15% 1.51% 2.90% 
United States 113,402 0.45% 1.48% 4.12% 8.34% 1.95% 5.32%         
Average   0.76% 1.37% 5.28% 8.86% 2.06% 4.03% 
This table reports the forecast errors for dividends, cash flows and earnings forecasts across the sample countries. FDPS error is the unsigned dividend per 
share forecast error. N is the number of dividend forecasts, Mean is the average value, and σ is the standard deviation. FCFPS error is the unsigned cash flow 







The difference between the accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts and naïve dividend estimates 
 
Panel A: Mean and standard deviation of time-series dividend forecasts error 
 
Naïve DPS 1 Naïve DPS 2 Naïve DPS 3 Naïve DPS 4 Naïve DPS 5 Naïve DPS 6 
 
Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ 
Australia 2.00% 2.97% 3.52% 5.89% 4.66% 6.66% 4.64% 7.11% 2.11% 3.66% 3.12% 5.40% 
Austria 0.93% 1.91% 1.55% 2.95% 2.22% 4.52% 1.82% 3.54% 1.33% 3.24% 1.43% 2.47% 
Belgium 1.56% 3.44% 2.67% 4.70% 5.68% 7.42% 5.35% 6.60% 3.19% 6.32% 1.30% 2.69% 
Denmark 0.94% 1.95% 1.89% 4.03% 2.61% 4.79% 2.48% 4.80% 1.69% 4.30% 1.49% 3.35% 
Finland 1.84% 2.73% 3.93% 5.88% 3.61% 4.80% 3.38% 5.07% 2.44% 3.72% 2.65% 3.88% 
France 0.85% 1.78% 2.85% 6.12% 3.45% 5.31% 3.69% 6.47% 2.20% 5.95% 1.04% 2.04% 
Germany 0.97% 1.53% 1.73% 2.90% 2.79% 4.39% 2.70% 4.75% 1.17% 1.67% 1.50% 2.61% 
Hong Kong 1.54% 2.62% 2.10% 3.63% 3.42% 5.08% 3.33% 5.17% 1.56% 2.74% 2.40% 4.33% 
Italy 2.54% 5.02% 3.85% 8.00% 4.61% 7.74% 3.18% 5.07% 6.76% 10.73% 2.07% 3.61% 
Japan 0.52% 0.88% 1.25% 2.43% 1.68% 2.53% 1.85% 3.08% 0.60% 1.11% 0.64% 1.28% 
Netherlands 1.15% 1.71% 2.38% 3.74% 2.97% 3.53% 2.66% 3.49% 1.37% 2.37% 1.55% 2.51% 
Spain 2.21% 4.71% 3.30% 7.62% 5.13% 8.49% 3.65% 6.15% 4.37% 8.76% 1.85% 3.20% 
Sweden 1.36% 2.62% 2.93% 5.07% 3.62% 5.44% 3.33% 5.19% 1.87% 3.67% 2.42% 4.75% 
Switzerland 0.74% 1.20% 1.96% 4.65% 2.97% 4.70% 3.04% 5.66% 0.90% 2.22% 1.11% 2.23% 
United Kingdom 3.36% 1.93% 3.42% 1.94% 3.46% 1.99% 4.38% 6.25% 3.40% 1.92% 0.97% 2.01% 
United States 1.13% 2.70% 2.75% 6.20% 5.04% 7.44% 5.21% 7.99% 1.87% 5.20% 1.70% 4.39% 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Differences in analyst vs. time-series dividend forecast precision 
 
Naïve DPS 1 Naïve DPS 2 Naïve DPS 3 Naïve DPS 4 Naïve DPS 5 Naïve DPS 6 Analyst 
vs. Naïve 
DPS 1   
Diff. p-value Diff. p-value Diff. p-value Diff. p-value Diff. p-value Diff. p-value 
Australia −0.88% 0.000 −2.54% 0.000 −3.67% 0.000 −3.67% 0.000 −1.12% 0.000 −2.01% 0.000 −43.8% 
Austria −0.37% 0.003 −1.01% 0.000 −1.68% 0.000 −1.29% 0.000 −0.79% 0.000 −0.84% 0.000 −39.8% 
Belgium −0.73% 0.000 −2.00% 0.000 −5.00% 0.000 −4.64% 0.000 −2.51% 0.000 −0.58% 0.000 −46.7% 
Denmark −0.25% 0.000 −1.20% 0.000 −1.92% 0.000 −1.79% 0.000 −1.00% 0.000 −0.79% 0.000 −26.9% 
Finland −0.60% 0.000 −2.69% 0.000 −2.38% 0.000 −2.15% 0.000 −1.20% 0.000 −1.41% 0.000 −32.8% 
France −0.32% 0.000 −2.23% 0.000 −2.83% 0.000 −3.07% 0.000 −1.58% 0.000 −0.54% 0.000 −37.4% 
Germany −0.38% 0.000 −1.17% 0.000 −2.23% 0.000 −2.14% 0.000 −0.61% 0.000 −0.94% 0.000 −38.6% 
Hong Kong −0.51% 0.000 −1.17% 0.000 −2.49% 0.000 −2.40% 0.000 −0.64% 0.000 −1.37% 0.000 −33.0% 
Italy −1.54% 0.000 −2.94% 0.000 −3.70% 0.000 −2.31% 0.000 −5.85% 0.000 −1.11% 0.000 −60.6% 
Japan −0.34% 0.000 −1.07% 0.000 −1.50% 0.000 −1.67% 0.000 −0.41% 0.000 −0.46% 0.000 −64.8% 
Netherlands −0.48% 0.000 −1.76% 0.000 −2.36% 0.000 −2.06% 0.000 −0.76% 0.000 −0.91% 0.000 −42.0% 
Spain −1.36% 0.000 −2.43% 0.000 −4.26% 0.000 −2.77% 0.000 −3.49% 0.000 −0.99% 0.000 −61.7% 
Sweden −0.36% 0.000 −1.99% 0.000 −2.68% 0.000 −2.39% 0.000 −0.93% 0.000 −1.48% 0.000 −26.6% 
Switzerland −0.25% 0.000 −1.50% 0.000 −2.51% 0.000 −2.58% 0.000 −0.43% 0.000 −0.56% 0.000 −34.0% 
United Kingdom −2.93% 0.000 −3.02% 0.000 −3.07% 0.000 −4.00% 0.000 −3.01% 0.000 −0.56% 0.000 −87.3% 
United States −0.65% 0.000 −2.23% 0.000 −4.52% 0.000 −4.74% 0.000 −1.35% 0.000 −1.27% 0.000 −57.6% 
              
Average −0.75% 0.000 −1.93% 0.000 −2.92% 0.000 −2.73% 0.000 −1.61% 0.000 −0.99% 0.000 −45.9% 
 
Panel A reports the mean and standard deviation of the unsigned forecast error for time-series dividend forecasts. Naïve DPS 1 is the random walk dividend 
forecast. Naïve DPS 2 is the dividend forecast calculated as the product of the mean payout ratio for a firm calculated over the previous seven years and the net 
income for the previous fiscal year. Naïve DPS 3 is the product of the target payout ratio from the Lintner model and net income for the previous fiscal year. 
Naïve DPS 4 is the product of the target payout ratio from the Lintner model and the analyst EPS forecast. Naïve DPS 5 is the predicted dividend from the 
Lintner model. Naïve DPS 6 is the product of previous year DPS and growth in DPS calculated over prior two years. All naïve dividend forecasts are expressed 
on a per-share basis using the number of shares outstanding reported on I/B/E/S summary files. The Average row reports the averages. Panel B reports the mean 
difference (Diff.) between the error in analyst dividend forecasts and the error of naïve dividend forecasts. p-value is the p-value for a two-tailed t-test of the 
hypothesis that the average difference in forecast errors is zero. Analyst vs. Naïve DPS 1 is the percentage difference between the (country-level) mean analyst 





Price reactions to dividend forecast revisions 
Panel A: Average price reactions to analyst dividend forecast revisions 
    ΔFDPS CAR 
 N ΔFDPS≥0 ΔFDPS<0 ΔFDPS≥0 ΔFDPS<0 
Australia 28,152 0.59% −0.88% 0.84% −1.10% 
Austria 2,065 0.37% −0.54% 0.60% −0.55% 
Belgium 3,650 0.34% −0.47% 0.42% −0.38% 
Denmark 3,765 0.30% −0.36% 0.77% −0.98% 
Finland 8,994 0.74% −0.77% 0.91% −1.08% 
France 26,134 0.26% −0.32% 0.64% −0.49% 
Germany 18,419 0.39% −0.52% 0.54% −0.75% 
Hong Kong 15,135 0.58% −0.51% 0.88% −0.38% 
Italy 8,163 0.57% −0.68% 0.30% −0.60% 
Japan 14,099 0.22% −0.38% 0.79% −0.55% 
Netherlands 6,759 0.37% −0.49% 0.53% −0.47% 
Spain 7,023 0.45% −0.52% 0.28% −0.14% 
Sweden 9,286 0.52% −0.62% 0.77% −0.80% 
Switzerland 10,363 0.20% −0.27% 0.60% −0.48% 
United Kingdom 27,887 0.23% −0.40% 0.77% −0.48% 
United States 37,691 0.38% −0.55% 0.27% −0.36% 
      
Average 
 
0.41% −0.52% 0.62% −0.60% 
Panel B: Price reaction regressions   







p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
ΔFEPS + 0.236 0.081 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.256 0.000 
ΔFDPS + 0.249 0.052 0.000 0.277 0.000 0.230 0.000 
ΔFEPS × ΔFDPS +    3.093 0.000 2.224 0.000 
ΔFCFPS  + 0.080 0.027 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.060 0.000 
Upgrade + 0.011 0.044 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000 
Downgrade − −0.015 −0.065 0.000 −0.015 0.000 −0.015 0.000 
ΔTP + 0.058 0.137 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.048 0.000 
ΔTP×ΔFDPS −    −0.161 0.038 −0.244 0.000 
Controls  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Firm effect  No   No  Yes  
Industry effect  Yes   Yes  No  
Year effect  Yes   Yes  Yes  
N  136,346   136,346  136,346  
p(F)  0.000   0.000  0.000  
R2  5.55%   5.55%    
 
Panel A reports average 3−day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) centered on dividend forecast revision dates for 
positive (ΔFDPS≥0) and negative (ΔFDPS<0) revisions. The ΔFDPS column reports the magnitude of positive and 
negative dividend forecast revisions. Panel B reports estimates from Eq. (2), where we regress CAR on ΔFDPS, 
earnings forecast revisions, ΔFEPS, an interaction ΔFEPS × ΔFDPS, two dummy variables for directional 
recommendation revisions, Upgrade, and Downgrade, target price revisions, ΔTP, and an interaction ΔTP×ΔFDPS. 
Models (1) and (2) include industry and year fixed effects. Model (3) includes firm fixed effects. The Std. Estimate 
column reports standardized estimates for a one-standard deviation increase in each regressor. Standard errors are 




Price reactions to joint earnings and dividend announcements 
 





p-val. Estimate p-val. Estimate p-val. Estimate p-val. Estimate p-val. Estimate p-val. 
Panel A: Regression results                      
UE 0.098 0.061 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.069 0.001 
UD 0.465 0.073 0.000 0.489 0.000   0.508 0.000 0.545 0.000   
UE×UD    1.819 0.000   1.700 0.003 2.234 0.000   
UCF 0.028 0.032 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.023 0.009 0.023 0.014 
UE×UCF    −0.082 0.362 −0.027 0.812 −0.028 0.800 0.011 0.922 −0.027 0.840 
ΔDiv      0.024 0.075 0.015 0.352 0.031 0.284 0.036 0.129 
UE+UD+             0.006 0.000 
UE+UD−            0.000 0.916 
UE−UD+            −0.004 0.015 
UE−UD−            −0.013 0.000 
Controls Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Yes  
Firm fixed effects No   No  No  No  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  No   No  
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 20,004    20,004   17,352   17,352   17,352  17,352  
p(F) 0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 0.000  
R2 1.87%     1.94%   1.32%   1.92%   
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Differences between coefficients 
Hypothesis: UE+UD+> UE+UD− 
F-test        15.820 
p-value        0.000 
Hypothesis: UE−UD− < UE−UD+ 
F-test        33.740 
p-value               0.000 
 
Panel A reports results for Eq. (3) that relate three−day cumulative abnormal returns around joint preliminary earnings and dividend announcements to 
earnings and dividend surprises. UE is the earnings surprise, UD is the dividend surprise, and UCF is the cash flow surprise. ΔDiv is the price−scaled 
difference between the current and previous fiscal year dividend per share. UE+UD+ is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm beats both analyst 
earnings and dividend expectations, and is zero otherwise. UE+UD− is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm beats earnings expectations, but 
does not beat analyst dividend expectations, and is zero otherwise. UE−UD+ is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm does not beat earnings 
expectations, but beats analyst dividend expectations, and is zero otherwise. UE−UD− is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm fails to beat 
both analyst earnings and dividend expectations, and is zero otherwise. We include Controls from Eq. (1) and industry and year fixed effects. We multiply the 
coefficient on ΔDiv by 100 and omit reporting the intercept. Std. Estimate (for Model (1) only) reports standardized estimates for a one-standard deviation 
increase in a regressor. Standard errors are firm-clustered and year dummies account for residual correlation across years (time-series dependence) and across 
firms in a given year (cross-sectional dependence). Industry dummies control for within-industry correlations. Firm effect captures firm fixed effects. Panel B 







Dividend surprises and future growth in earnings  
Panel A: Regression estimates 
 
     








UE+UD+ 0.145 0.035 0.032 0.162 0.068 0.014 
UE+UD− −0.195 −0.037 0.013 −0.183 −0.064 0.014 
UE−UD+ 0.092 0.019 0.208 0.114 0.041 0.112 
UE−UD− −0.177 −0.037 0.024 −0.151 −0.057 0.039 
UE+ Naïve UD1+ −0.029 −0.008 0.820 −0.005 −0.002 0.971 
UE+ Naïve UD1− 0.053 0.011 0.691 0.071 0.029 0.586 
UE−Naïve UD1+ −0.183 −0.046 0.151 −0.168 −0.071 0.175 
UE−Naïve UD1− −0.138 −0.028 0.293 −0.133 −0.058 0.307 




 Yes  
Firm effect No   
 Yes  
Industry effect Yes   
 No  
Year effect Yes   




 10,331  
p(Chi2) 0.000   
 0.000  
Pseudo R2 8.31% 
 
 
    
Panel B: Differences between coefficients 
  Model (1) Model (2) 
Hypothesis: UE+UD+> UE+UD− Chi2−test 23.270 25.200 
 p−value 0.000 0.000 
Hypothesis: UE−UD−< UE−UD+ Chi2−test 12.740 13.630 
 p−value 0.000 0.000 
Hypothesis: UE+ Naïve UD1+> UE+ Naïve UD1− Chi2−test 1.550 1.270 
 p−value 0.214 0.260 
Hypothesis: UE− Naïve UD1−< UE− Naïve UD1+ Chi2−test 0.420 0.260 
  p−value 0.516 0.609 
 
Panel A reports results for Eq. (4), which examines the likelihood of future earnings growth conditional on the sign 
of earnings and dividend surprises in the current period. UE+UD+, UE+UD−, UE−UD+, UE−UD− are indicator 
variables for combinations of earnings surprises and dividend surprises. UE+ Naïve UD1+, UE+ Naïve UD1−, UE− 
Naïve UD1+, UE− Naïve UD1− are indicator variables for combinations of earnings surprises and dividend changes. 
UCF is the cash flow surprise. We include controls from Eq. (1) and industry and year fixed effects. The Std. 
Estimate column reports standardized estimates for a one-standard deviation increase in a regressor. Standard 
errors are firm-clustered and year dummies account for residual correlation across years (time-series dependence) 
and across firms in a given year (cross-sectional dependence). Industry dummies control for within-industry 
correlations. Firm effect captures firm fixed effects. Panel B reports Chi2−tests for the differences in coefficient 






Dividend forecast revisions and changes in institutional holdings 
 














ΔFDPSQ + 0.073 0.023 0.000 0.939 0.032 0.000 0.062 0.011 0.069 
ΔFEPSQ + 0.037 0.021 0.002 0.783 0.048 0.000 −0.010 −0.003 0.538 
ΔFCFPSQ + 0.005 0.002 0.631 0.215 0.011 0.031 
−0.019 −0.005 0.302 
ΔTPQ + 0.008 0.019 0.000 0.122 0.032 0.000 −0.001 −0.002 0.672 
UpgradeQ + −0.001 −0.003 0.566 −0.007 −0.002 0.593 0.003 0.004 0.538 
DowngradeQ − 0.002 0.006 0.117 0.011 0.003 0.399 −0.007 −0.010 0.032 
ΔDivQ+1  + 0.060 0.046 0.000 0.220 0.017 0.221 
0.033 0.014 0.171 
ΔDiv Q+1 | ΔFDPSQ − −0.059 −0.045 0.000 −0.219 −0.017 0.222 −0.031 −0.013 0.170 
Controls  Yes 
 
 Yes  
 Yes  
 
Firm fixed effects  No   No   No   
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   
N  48,786   48,786   48,786   
p(F)  0.000   0.000   0.000   
R2   4.00%     14.30%     2.77%     
 
This table reports estimates for Eq. (5), which relates changes in the next quarter institutional holdings, ΔIO, to mean quarterly changes in analyst dividend 
forecasts, ΔFDPSQ, measured in the current quarter. We also report estimates where the dependent variable in Eq. (5) are changes in the number of institutional 
investors, Δ#investors, and changes in percentage institutional ownership by pension funds and endowments, Δ% pension funds. ΔFEPSQ are quarterly changes 
in analyst earnings forecasts, ΔFCFPSQ the quarterly changes in analyst cash flow forecasts, ΔTPQ changes in quarterly target prices, UpgradeQ and DowngradeQ 
are quarterly consensus stock recommendation upgrades and downgrades. ΔDiv Q+1 is the price−scaled difference between quarter q+1 announced dividend per 
share and previous fiscal year dividend per share; ΔDiv Q+1 is set to zero for non-announcement quarters. ΔDivQ+1_|_ΔFDPSQ is the ΔDiv Q+1 conditional on analyst 
dividend forecast revisions in the previous quarter. The Std. Estimate column reports standardized estimates for a one-standard deviation increase in a regressor.  
We include firm controls and industry and year fixed effects from Eq. (1) and omit reporting the intercept. Standard errors are firm-clustered and year dummies 
account for residual correlation across years (time-series dependence) and across firms in a given year (cross-sectional dependence). Industry dummies control for 
within-industry correlations. Firm effect captures firm fixed effects.  
 
